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Making Thinking Visible with Atlas.ti:  
Computer Assisted Qualitative Analysis as Textual 
Practices 
Zdeněk Konopásek ∗ 
Abstract: How is a new quality of reading, which we call 
“sociological understanding”, created during the proces of 
qualitative analysis? A methodological (conventional) an-
swer to this question usually speaks of mental processes and 
conceptual work. This paper suggests a different view – so-
ciological rather than methodological; or more precisely a 
view inspired by a contemporary sociology of science. It 
describes qualitative analysis as a set of material practices. 
Taking grounded theory methodology and the work with the 
computer programme Atlas.ti as an example, it is argued 
that thinking is inseparable from doing even in this domain. 
It is argued that by adopting the suggested perspective we 
might be better able to speak of otherwise hardly graspable 
processes of qualitative analysis in more accountable and 
instructable ways. Further, software packages would be bet-
ter understood not only as “mere tools” for coding and re-
trieving, but also as complex virtual environments for em-
bodied and practice-based knowledge making. Finally, 
grounded theory methodology might appear in a somewhat 
different light: when described not in terms of methodologi-
cal or theoretical concepts but rather in terms of what we 
practically do with the analysed data, it becomes perfectly 
compatible with the radical constructivist, textualist, or even 
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post-structuralist paradigms of interpretation (from which it 
has allegedly departed by a long way). 
1. Introduction 
Some contemporaries of the previous version of Atlas.ti (version 4), a software 
tool for qualitative data analysis, may remember the quirk in it. As a new-
comer, while playing with options and menus of the programme, you could 
have become tempted to try a very promising option offered in the menu for 
work with textual documents: Relevant text search. Here it is, you thought, 
definitely the key function in computerised qualitative analysis, let us click on 
it! After choosing it, however, a small info window popped up with an ironic 
reply to your command: “Do you believe in magic?” And, if you were happy 
enough to have your PC equipped with a sound card you could also hear a 
significative hawking, indicating that you had just done something really fool-
ish.  
Software packages such as Atlas.ti simply cannot do mental work for you. It 
is always you, as the analyst, who has to do the real analysis. Because only 
human researchers can think. The software only provides more or less useful 
assistance and support to the thinking subject.1 It extends the researcher’s 
mental capabilities to organise, to remember, and to be systematic. But while 
doing so it essentially remains a stupid instrument, which cannot do things such 
as determining the relevance of a text passage. Humans, not machines, do the 
crucial work of coding and retrieving – i.e., decide what passages of data 
should be marked by what terms to be searched and browsed later on. The hope 
that the programme would do more and be able to replace the analytic mind is 
foolish. Only human researchers can make sense and analytic use of otherwise 
meaningless operations of the computer – such was the unforgettable lesson 
given by this little nasty quirk, incorporated into the design of the programme. 
                                                             
1  Hence the notion of CAQDAS, computer assisted qualitative data analysis software, used 
for this family of qualitative computing. It should be noted, however, that there are other 
programmes useful for qualitative analysts, but constructed quite differently, namely on the 
principles of co-ocurrence analysis. These programmes are explicitly intended for genera-
tion and attribution of meaning on the basis of computerised analysis (with practically no 
direct intervention of a clever human mind) of co-word networks in huge bodies of data 
(TEIL & LATOUR 1995). Attempts at “intelligent” computer processing of qualitative data 
are explored even within the family of classical CAQDAS tools. Software called Qualrus 
(<http://www.qualrus.com>) recently introduced the concept of “intelligent coding”. The 
programme attempts to propose suitable codes for selected quotations on the basis of an 
analysis – running as a background process on the computer – of all coding operations 
made so far (assuming that quotations containing similar words would be coded similarly) 
… But let us leave these interesting developments aside for now. 
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This was an important and much needed lesson, of course, which was de-
signed to prevent a typical misunderstanding about CAQDAS. Yet, I am con-
vinced that the argument was (and still is) somewhat misleading. Indeed, in this 
paper I would like to suggest that making CAQDAS a substantively irrelevant 
and purely instrumental technical extension and support of mental processes 
was a disservice, something of a poke in the eye of all qualitative research. I 
argue that the entire idea that software essentially represents what occurs in the 
analyst’s head strengthened a classical “methodological” view of qualitative 
analysis, emphasizing the role of a researcher who is superior to his or her 
research subjects by virtue of special qualities of his or her thinking. Accord-
ingly, this way of thinking suppressed a non-exclusive, say “ethnomethod-
ological” position, which highlights taken-for-granted material practices and 
instructability of knowledge production.  
Such a mentalistic approach, either implicit or explicit, has had two unhappy 
consequences. First, CAQDAS has developed problematic relationships with 
those theoretical-methodological positions in qualitative research, increasingly 
influential among members of the community that departed from objectivist 
methodology. Computer assisted qualitative data analysis is seen as not easily 
compatible with radical constructivism or post-structuralist understandings of 
language. Some scholars have even argued that under the disguise of the inno-
vation called qualitative computing, a conservative (“modernist”) approach 
reaffirmed its position (COFFEY, HOLBROOK & ATKINSON. 1996).  
Second, a unique opportunity for better understanding qualitative analysis as 
a set of mediations and embodied practices has been missed. This is really 
unfortunate, since such an understanding is priceless for our ability to defend, 
explain and teach qualitative research. In texts on qualitative research, there is 
usually an abundance of descriptions of various paradigms, approaches and 
theoretical frameworks; or of data collection procedures, fieldwork practices or 
research ethics. But when it comes to practices by means of which a new qual-
ity of reading (which we call sociological understanding) emerges, descriptions 
often become somewhat vague and poor.2 Analysis and interpretation of quali-
tative data are often seen as performances of “pure reason” to such an extent 
that it is very difficult to provide a clear and practice-oriented account of it. 
There seem to be no intermediaries here, just the lucid mind of the researcher 
contemplating the data. And it is the mind that is responsible for deduction, 
induction, generalization, conceptualization, comparison – as basically mental 
operations …  
Such accounts do reveal important things about qualitative analysis. But 
they are of a limited help. It is especially true when one has to explain to an 
outsider or to a student in what terms qualitative analysis consists of anything 
                                                             
2  This tendency that writings on qualitative research “are long on their discussions of data 
collection and research experiences and short on analysis” has been noted also by 
STRAUSS (1987, p.xi). 
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more than a careful reading of data, spiced by providential insights and obser-
vations (if there ever are any). As a consequence, it is claimed that qualitative 
research is in fact an art, hardly graspable and transferable (DENZIN 1994, 
p.512 and others). It is emphasised, in response to inquiring questions about 
“how it is done”, that there is no single qualitative method and that analysis of 
data can hardly be separated from other research-related activities (which can 
subsequently be described at length). Qualitative research is presented as a 
complex and context-dependent activity that resists a cook-book style of in-
structions. 
Similar responses are surely not wrong. Not per se. But they avoid the main 
point. Even worse: by avoiding the point they make it even more urgent – how 
qualitative analysis actually generates a new knowledge, in a distinctive and 
recognizable way? Conventionally, as we have seen, people are told that it is 
not by pressing a button in the interface of a computer programme. This would 
not help, it is believed, because everything important happens in our minds, in 
a way that is difficult to explain. My paper takes a different road though. I will 
try to talk about material practices and inter-actions, rather than of mental 
operations of an individual. The ambition here cannot be to explain the logic of 
(grounded theory) qualitative analysis better and deeper than, e.g., Anselm 
STRAUSS in his marvellous “Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists” 
(1987). Rather, I would only like to take STRAUSS more seriously in the mo-
ment when he notes that research work consists of “sets of tasks, both physical 
and conceptual” (STRAUSS 1987, p.1; italics added by ZK). And because the 
conceptual usually seems to be overrepresented in qualitative methodology 
writings, including the STRAUSS’s book, I will focus here on the physical. 
“Thinking” will be bracketed out – not because is is unimportant, of course; 
but because its presence cannot account for differences between ordinary 
knowledge practices (e.g., of research subjects) and qualitative analysis worth 
of the name (on the side of the researcher). Of course, we analysts do think. No 
question about that. But so do all the others, including our research subjects. 
Therefore it does not make much sense to ground the superiority of sociologi-
cal knowledge almost exclusively in our mental qualities and in the very act of 
… thinking. Rather we should focus, as science and technology studies do, on 
practical manipulations with visible, hearable and palpable pieces of reality that 
have the power of making the final sentence stronger and more durable than 
any other competing statement (LATOUR  1987, one for all). 
In the next section I am going to briefly explain this particular inspiration 
taken from science and technology studies. Then I will discuss the place of 
grounded theory methodology (GTM) and Atlas.ti in my overall argument. 
Also, I will clarify in what sense it is possible to keep the focus on material 
practices in the virtual environment of a computer programme. The main part 
then follows: an attempt to describe the analytical work with Atlas.ti in terms 
of creation and operation of a “textual laboratory”. The most ordinary analytic 
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procedures such as data segmenting and coding, linking or memoing will be 
presented as practical manipulations with objects visible on the screen. Pre-
cisely these manipulations endow the knowledge arising from qualitative 
analysis with qualities that make it distinct from ordinary members’ knowl-
edge. Furthermore, they enable us to speak of qualitative analysis in an instruc-
table, practical way. The conclusion will discuss some broader theoretical 
consequences of such reframing of our thinking about qualitative analysis.    
2. The Inspiration from Science Studies 
Bruno LATOUR (1995) in his article on a research expedition to the Amazon 
forests gives an illustrative example of how contemporary science studies un-
derstand the operation of scientific work. The question is how it is possible that 
scientific texts speak of reality; what constitutes their reference to the things 
under study. This question of the relation between the word and the world is an 
old one. But the perspective of science studies comes out with a novel answer 
to it. As a sociologist of science, LATOUR avoids theoretical concepts of epis-
temology and offers an ethnographic account (accompanied by a set of photo-
graphs) of various practices by which members of the research expedition 
“translate” the border between savana and forest somewhere in Amazonia (i.e., 
the phenomenon under study) into the text of a scientific report. He emphasises 
that the empirical evidence he presents contains no traces of a mysterious jump 
from the world to a word; rather, we can follow numerous small practical op-
erations by means of which reality is more and more loaded with meaning and 
progressively de-materialised so that it becomes increasingly “textual”. There 
is no direct bridge between the world and the word, only chains of translations 
– i.e., practical manipulations and interventions by which a piece of natural 
landscape is turned into a field laboratory with exact parameters and coordi-
nates; by which lumps of soil become sufficiently representative samples; and 
by which qualities of these lumps can be substituted by written codes and 
comments so that the studied boundary between savanna and forest can succes-
sively be inscribed into something else, and therefore inhabit/constitute the 
paper realm of texts.3 
Like LATOUR, or many his colleagues, we could follow the series of trans-
lations made by qualitative researchers on the move from the field to the realm 
of textual data. For instance, something (which has happened) is narrated by an 
interviewee; the narration is recorded; the recording is transcribed; the tran-
script is incorporated to a set of data … each such step means that something is 
lost and something is gained. In general, it is materiality what is lost – e.g., 
                                                             
3  The role of texts and textualisations (inscriptions) in scientific work is summarised by 
LAW (1986). 
 281
material specificities of the interview act, such as the totality of voice modula-
tion, smells, gestures and surrounding environment. What is gained? Meaning 
is gained, simply put. This is possible because the gradual loss of materiality 
brings about new possibilities. Once reality is narrated, recorded, and tran-
scribed we can better manipulate it – store, transport, compress, mark, juxta-
pose to another realities, cut into pieces, recompose, reorder, etc. Only thanks 
to these manipulations we can see (and show) differences and similarities, 
emerging patterns, new contexts.  
Since we proceed in such a way that it is always possible to go back, along 
the chain of transformations (i.e., from a quotation in our paper to the transcrip-
tion, to the recording, and – with the help of fieldnotes and labels on tapes – to 
the situation of the interview or even, to some extent, to the “original” event) 
we can speak of reference. Hence the LATOUR’s argument, which he so nicely 
illustrated by the case of the research expedition to the Amazon forest: scien-
tific texts speak of reality not because of a mysterious bond between things and 
words (something philosophers are so busy with), but rather thanks to well-tied 
chains of small transformations, during which something is preserved while 
other qualities are lost.4  
However, I am not so much interested here in reference as a bond between 
the world and the word which we strive to maintain during the move from the 
field to analytic work on data. Rather, my task is to apply science studies’ 
imagination to a “next step”, i.e., to the qualitative analysis itself, more pre-
cisely, to the work with the programme Atlas.ti. I would like to show that what 
is often seen as an achievement of mind can be perhaps better described in 
terms of practical manipulations with bodies of texts. 
3. Why Choose GTM as an Example?  
But what kind of qualitative analysis am I going to discuss? There exist differ-
ent traditions and approaches to qualitative analysis5 and my account will in no 
case be “methodologically neutral”. In general, I am going to take as an exam-
ple the kind of qualitative research that is close to what is known as grounded 
theory methodology (GTM, see GLASER & STRAUSS 1967).  
I should stress right from the beginning that it is not “grounded theory 
methodology” as a label for a self-contained epistemology that really matters. 
Rather, by GTM I refer to a loosely defined set of analytic practices, the use of 
                                                             
4  For instance, a recording is well-tied with its translation into text by means of accurate and 
faithful transcription. ASHMORE and REED (2000), among others, show that it is not an 
easy task. 
5  Identification and comparison of different paradigms in qualitative research has become a 
popular topic in books and articles (CRESWELL 1997; GUBA & LINCOLN 1994; GU-
BRIUM & HOLSTEIN 1997).  
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which is very common among sociologists, ethnographers, psychologists or 
even historians. Howard BECKER (1993, p.228) says that “… general state-
ments of what must be done to be scientifically adequate rely, usually without 
acknowledgement, on practical matters and, in this, they follow rather than lead 
everyday practice.” This is very close to the position of science studies in 
which the perspective of methodology is suppressed in favour of a sociological 
study of “science in action”.6 Therefore, to put it in a rather non-
methodological way (i.e., without reference to the established notions of theo-
retical saturation, axial coding or constant comparison), I am going to talk 
about the kind of qualitative research projects which make use of large amounts 
of data, that are analysed in systematic and rigorous ways, and which aspire to 
provide knowledge different from (and in a way superior to) what is usually 
known by studied members or participants. 
There are several good reasons for choosing GTM as an example for my ar-
gument. First, the choice is not surprising given the credit the authors of Al-
tas.ti themselves make to this particular approach (MUHR & FRIESE 2004). 
Further, whether one likes it or not, GTM enjoys persisting popularity, espe-
cially among students and teachers, and aspires to be taken as an overall strat-
egy for non-deductive research projects. Occasionally, if taken as a generic 
approach for generating theory out of qualitative data, it is even perceived as a 
synonymum for qualitative research.7 The current CAQDAS epidemy even 
strengthens this hegemony. Last and perhaps most important (and in close 
relation to the above) GTM is nowadays a challenged and often misunderstood 
qualitative paradigm. Some regard it as somewhat obsolete and associated with 
modernist adherence to scientific rigour and objectivity, improper for interpre-
tive social research (LINCOLN & DENZIN 1994). Further, software packages 
organised around the procedures of coding and retrieving contributed to a more 
or less implicit conviction that grounded theory methodology is nothing but an 
application of the code-and-retrieve principle. This is an unfortunate misappre-
hension (STRAUSS & CORBIN 1994), which is difficult to combat. 
On the other hand, however, the “ecumenical” focus on something-like-
grounded-theory-methodology is relatively arbitrary. In fact, we could try to 
follow other analytic practices – e.g., in conversation analysis or narrative 
analysis – equally well (perhaps with the risk of being less widely understood, 
since these practices are familiar to fewer social science people). 
It should be also stressed that I am not going to come out with some new 
and specific analytical procedures. No new analytical techniques and no new 
features of Atlas.ti will be proposed. Instead, I suggest just an alternative “the-
                                                             
6  A similar emphasis on research practices and a reserve toward theories of qualitative re-
search can be found in SEALE (1999). 
7  After all, the title of the already quoted book on GTM by Anselm STRAUSS (1987) is 
“Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists” (without further qualification). 
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ory” and practice-oriented account of very ordinary and basic procedures we all 
usually do as analysts. 
4. Reality, Virtuality and Practices 
A question might appear: if we are to understand material practices of qualita-
tive analysis, why not to look at a pre-CAQDAS researcher working with real 
things such as sheets and pieces of paper, printers, colour pencils, scissors, glue 
and card files? Such a focus would definitely be very possible. And at some 
moments it could be pretty illuminating.  
In comparison to that when an analyst works with a specialised computer 
programme, the only thing he or she can manipulate seems to be pure informa-
tion – bits and bytes that are thought to represent ideas in researcher’s mind. 
Indeed, if we consider a computer to be a direct extension of human thinking, 
we could hardly talk about material practices at all.8 But computers can be 
viewed differently. They have keyboards, mouses, speakers and monitors. And 
on screens of monitors we can create, see and manipulate various objects. 
These objects can be of different sizes and shapes; they can be hidden, moved, 
split, colourized, grouped and regrouped, forgotten and rediscovered on unex-
pected occasions. In short, computers provide a virtualised environment in 
which we can not only do all the operations available to the pre-CAQDAS 
researcher equipped with paper, scissors and pencils, but much more. Virtual 
objects on the screen are even more shapeable by and embedded in practices 
than real ones. 
4.1 The creation and basic operation of textual laboratory 
What do researchers practically do with Atlas.ti when analyzing their data? Let 
me pick up just a few key moments of the process. I will proceed from what is 
typical for the beginning of the project to what usually takes place at later 
stages. 
                                                             
8  Of course, even working with cards, scissors and colour pencils within the “old” paper-
pencil model can be (and usually is) viewed as a direct extension of mental processes. But 
still, most people would probably think that picking computers with their virtual, “non-
material” environment as an example is not the best way how to overcome this mentalistic 
or representationist approach. But I believe the opposite is true: CAQDAS is an opportunity 
to grasp an alternative view of qualitative analysis as a set of practical manipulations with 
data. 
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4.1.1 Assigning primary documents 
In Atlas.ti a research project is defined by a set of “primary documents” (PD). 
These are our data. And data, so is the common belief, are what we gather in 
the field. True, but this is only a half of the story. Because data are also every-
thing that we strive to put on one place, on one table. Or, more exactly, into a 
single textual laboratory – which has the power to shrink time and space dis-
tances between observable phenomena so that everything important is present 
and under control.9 
We can better understand the point when we imagine what happens when 
primary documents are assigned to a project (to a “hermeneutic unit”, as it is 
called in Atlas.ti). Adding new documents has important practical conse-
quences: once we open the hermeneutical unit next time we immediately have 
all the materials at hand. These materials can have various formats – they can 
be texts, photographs, scanned documents, audio or video recordings. They can 
even be physically located on various media – on harddisks, optical discs, local 
network or the Internet. But most importantly, these documents can have their 
origin in a variety of times and places. They refer to different sites and mo-
ments.  
Interviews, recorded and transcribed, could have been made, for instance, 
during last two years in dozens of housholds and offices in several middle-
sized cities. But the interview transcripts, or other data “from the field”, are not 
the only documents that may belong to the primary documents of our project. 
Other primary documents, depending on circumstances, could be: excerpts 
from literature on the topic, written down actually during our entire profes-
sional career either at home or during study trips abroad; scholarly articles 
downloaded from online databases and covering several decades of relevant 
research; selected newspaper articles on the problem, published in the last 
decades; related official documents obtained from the Internet or coaxed from a 
range of involved authorities; a project proposal of our research written almost 
three years ago; e-mail exchanges with colleagues home and abroad that took 
place when the project proposal was prepared. And so on. 
So now we have all this in sight and within arm’s reach. Or rather, we have 
all this available for scrutiny with the help of a few clicks of the computer 
mouse. While browsing primary documents of the project, we travel in time 
and space. It is unbelievably easy and fast: click, click. An interview with Mr. 
Miller from the city of Plzen, May 2005: we talked about how new civil or-
                                                             
9  Laboratory has been a prominent topic within contemporary sociology of science both in 
the literal sense (i.e., in a number of laboratory studies such as KNORR-CETINA & 
MULKAY 1983; LATOUR & WOOLGAR 1986; LYNCH 1985) and more widely in the 
sense of laboratory as a basic instrument for (scientific) control and visualisation (GIERYN 
2006; MILLER & O’LEARY 1994). 
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ganisations in the Czech Republic had been established in the beginning of 
1990s. Click, click. A resolution of the governmental council for NGOs ap-
proved one month ago: it suggests a redefinition of the legal status of some 
non-profit organizations. Click, click. My own excerpts from a book on envi-
ronmental movements, published in 1984: I made the excerpts roughly five 
years ago in Paris when I was writing a short note on new social movements. 
Now, in the context of these excerpts, what exactly did Mr. Miller say? Click, 
click, and here we are.10 
When I was reading the book on environmental movements, I did not know 
about Mr. Miller’s civil association. I was not even interested in it. I had no 
idea that I would engage, several years later, in a research project on expertise 
and democracy, for which I would also need interviews with local activists. 
And at the moment when I was doing my interview with Mr. Miller I only 
vaguely recollected what the authors of the book had said. The two events were 
too distant from each other. Both temporally and geografically. And also in 
terms of their nature, since the former concerns “theory” (and broader socio-
logical contexts) while the latter is about the production of “empirical evi-
dence” (and my own data). But at the present moment they are juxtaposed, next 
to each other, right at hand: Paris and Plzen 1993 and 2005 (referring to the 
early 1980s and early 1990s) – here and now. The distance between the two 
pieces of reality is very small at the present moment, measurable by a few 
clicks of the computer mouse. They can be carefully compared and confronted. 
As primary documents, they have standardized headers (e.g., in comments 
attached to each PD) that enable us to keep the reference to the original distant 
times and places. 
4.1.2 Defining quotations: Cutting PDs into pieces 
But it is difficult to juxtapose entire PDs. They are too large. There usually is 
no practical way to squeeze two full transcripts into a single unifying view. We 
can see more than one PD at once only as a list of items or a set of icons in a 
window, arranged in various ways. Even more, it is hard to see – at one mo-
ment – a single entire PD. Both our visual field and the size of the screen are 
limited. We can always see but a couple of paragraphs.11 
We need a different kind of object to be able to closely study our data. 
Something smaller. That is why we mark some paragraphs or sentences of 
particular interest as “quotations”. In the first view it looks like marking rele-
vant passages on the margin of a book. But the virtual environment allows 
more: in fact, by marking a piece of data, we not only modify and extend the 
                                                             
10  For the sake of simplicity, the examples and names are not authentic, however they are 
inspired by real work. The same is true for the rest of the examples in this paper. 
11  There are some differences if we consider audio recordings or images instead of textual 
PDs, but basically the argument would be similar. 
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original PD, but also create a new analytical object – a piece of data separated 
and freed from its original context. The separation is never complete though. 
We can always trace back the quotations to their original location.  
What is the advantage of having the marked quotations at hand as self-
contained objects? We now have our data in a form that better fits the screen 
and, in its variety and multiplicity, our field of view.12 The references to the 
original PDs are preserved: this is what Mr. Miller said, that is what the gov-
ernmental resolution stated, and here we have a sociological observation from 
literature. But now we can work with all these textual pieces together, since the 
data are transformed in a double way. First, they are reduced in number so that 
we can focus only on what we have found relevant so far.13 Second, they are 
reduced in size so that they become graspable pieces of data. Only now can we 
arrange, on the screen of a monitor, unprecedented rendezvous that occur under 
our direct visual control: a piece of a legal document (a particular paragraph) 
meets a piece of an interview or a passage from an older research report.14 Do 
they support each other? Do they contradict? In what sense? Now we are in a 
good position to start arguing about all that. 
Indeed, quotations are elementary units of analysis not only because their 
meanings are reasonably contained and therefore accessible to our minds and 
mental processing; they are also of reasonable physical size to be grasped and 
processed in a material way – by eyes, hands, lists and boxes, computer 
screens. Hence the general point of this paper, i.e., to show that analytical work 
is in an important sense a material praxis (and vice versa). 
There is a big “but” in this though. The more quotations we have, the more 
distant from each other they again become. They are so numerous that one 
easily gets drowned in data. It takes a long and painful journey to find a way, or 
even the way, the connection, from one piece to another. Two relevant pas-
sages are often separated from each other by hours of careful reading and 
browsing.  
                                                             
12  A number of practical recommendations regarding formatting of PDs and font settings, both 
aimed at good arrangement of visualisation, could be given here. From the perspective pre-
sented here, these would be directly relevant for analytic procedures. 
13  The list of quotations is not fixed, of course, it grows as we process the data; and some 
quotations may be deleted. Also, we often go back to the original documents and look for 
other relevant passages. But in any case, by creating quotations we create a selection of data 
that allow us to look at them in greater detail. 
14  Let us also note: the particular comment of Mr. Miller was highlighted as important last 
Tuesday, while the paragraph of the resolution had been marked as relevant ten months ago, 
before the fieldwork started; and the argument from literature has just been noted. (We im-
mediately see these procedural details when we look at the quotations – the date of their 
creation or modification is an automatically generated part of their headers.) Thus, not only 
various documents meet in front of our eyes at this moment, but also various moments of 
our own previous analytical work. 
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4.1.3 Codes and coding: Reintegrating the pieces 
Pieces of data, quotations, need to be somehow ordered to become manageable 
even in large quantities. This is where the procedure known as coding comes in 
as a useful strategy.15 By coding we link certain quotations together and form 
thematic groups of data-pieces. Codes are names for such groups, indicating 
what kind of quotations can be found in each particular bundle. Here the gath-
ered documents, interviews, excerpts, scholarly papers, project proposals, and 
media articles speak, for instance, about “money”, here about “legislation” and 
here about “negotiation”. With the help of codes (and the virtual Atlas.ti envi-
ronment), we can see the thematic countours of each group of quotations16 as 
well as the size of the groups. 
But codes are not just names, conceptual labels. They are also useful han-
dles with which we can grasp and manipulate respective groups of data-
pieces.17 Codes can be selected, commented, ordered, filtered, moved, renamed, 
split, and linked to each other. They can be viewed in lists, hierarchies, network 
views or as particular occurrences (instances) when browsing through our data. 
Anytime we are doing an operation with a code (e.g., when we are linking it to 
another code or just selecting it) we do some indirect work on all associated 
quotations as well.  
Now, instead of having to freely dig through and through an unsorted heap 
of quotations, we can proceed more effectively. By means of coding, quota-
tions gain relevance and meaningfulness. Some groups of quotations become 
closer than others. Coded data selectively shrink analytic distances between 
some pieces of data, making these elementary units more manageable. In short, 
they allow for a kind of more efficient, thematically or semantically organised 
reading.18  
                                                             
15  Coding is precisely the moment when an objection may easily arise: semantic relevance 
cannot be assessed by a computer programme such as Atlas.ti; the crucial analytical as-
sessments and decisions necessary for the coding process have to be made by a thinking 
subject. But again, I do not deny that qualitative analysts have to think. I only say that the 
practical instructive value of an appeal such as “Think! Think more and better!” is rather 
low. Furthermore, just taking notice of a semantic relationship does not bring, in itself, any 
analytic utility. Such an observation becomes effective only together with its inscription 
into an analytical object (“link”) that allows for its further use. 
16  That is why it is so important to choose appropriate names for codes. If we choose badly, 
we do not see the content of quotation aggregates clearly enough.  
17  Since we can use several such handles at once, we should keep codes simple and refering to 
a single thing – we can always combine them freely later.  
18  The possibilities of organised reading are further enhanced by the ability of Atlas.ti to make 
complex queries: we can, for instance, view all the quotations that speak both about “nego-
tiation” and “legislation” (and study how exactly in all the speficities). 
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4.2 Making the textual laboratory really useful: Beyond  
code-and-retrieve 
Four principles, on which Atlas.ti operates, are introduced in the user’s manual 
(MUHR & FRIESE 2004, pp.3-4): visualization, integration, serendipity, and 
exploration. Exploration is a very general term and can be applied to almost 
anything we do in qualitative analysis.19 The remaining three principles are 
more specific, and thus more interesting.  
It can be said that the previous section of this paper, focused on the basic 
logic of coding-and-retrieving, dealt primarilly with what MUHR and FRIESE 
called integration – i.e., with how it is practically accomplished by the analyst 
that heterogeneous pieces of data are held within reach, kept under control and 
become manipulable. Indeed, coding-and-retrieving refers to not much more 
than the mere possibility of organised and efficient reading. No matter that so 
many people cannot imagine that qualitative analysis would consist of anything 
more than precisely this procedure, a rigorous analytic knowledge originates in 
something else other than only the coding-and-retrieving activity. And this 
something else has something to do with the other two principles, visualization 
and serendipity.20 
4.2.1 Writing comments 
Each of the analytic objects we create in Atlas.ti – PDs, quotations, links, and 
network views – can be accompanied by a comment. There also are “free” 
comments, called memos, that can be attached either to more or less than one 
(kind of) object. The ways in which comments are used may be different, de-
pending on the kind of commented object and chosen strategy. For instance, 
comments to individual PDs may contain detailed information about the source 
of data. Code comments would typically, but not necessarily, be descriptions or 
explanations of names given to less obvious or less descriptive codes. In the 
case of quotations or links, comments might provide explanations of why we 
have created these objects – i.e., what was so interesting about them.  
Memos are a special case. Their importance and analytical use is typically 
growing together with the progress of our analysis. In memos we integrate 
                                                             
19  The authors jokingly admit that “exploration” was included among the principles mainly to 
obtain a nicer acronym (VISE). 
20  Visualisation and visual representation has been extensively debated in contemporary 
science studies (LYNCH & WOOLGAR 1990; LATOUR 1986; SNYDER 1998). By 
means of visualisation we create conditions for controlling, manipulating, and accumulating 
small pieces of knowledge, often meaningless in themselves, and integrating them into 
more elaborated and complex statements. Nice strategies of visualisation in qualitative re-
search can be found in MILES and HUBERMAN (1994). 
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partial observations. The integration is not just an abstract mental operation. It 
corresponds with the ability of memos to be attached to several codes, quota-
tions and other memos at once. We can therefore imagine memos as embryo-
paragraphs or -pages of a future research report, already well-founded in em-
pirical data and embedded in a broader argument (in the structure of other 
memos). Ideally, the report should be at least half-written within Atlas.ti: much 
of writing the report in a text processor (outside of Atlas.ti) would then consist 
of editing, associating and completing pieces of texts contained in memos and 
associated analytical objects, especially quotations and various other com-
ments. However, such a dense and empirically grounded network of Atlas.ti 
analytical objects does not appear out of nothing. It is the result of a long-term 
work which goes through and beyond the above-described code-and-retrieve 
operations. What kind of work?  
It is generally thought that the main purpose of commenting on analytical 
objects is to help one’s memory. The best way to prevent the ideas emerging 
from our reading the data becoming lost to our minds is to write these ideas 
down. Again, this is a conventional view, in which the use of software pro-
motes and extends our mental capabilities. But there are other benefits of 
commenting. 
First of all, it is important to note that commenting is one of the key moves 
that constitute interpretation of data. By means of writing comments the re-
searcher inscribes him- or herself into the studied material so that it becomes 
more and more under control. In the beginning, almost everything we have “on 
the table” is what others say; as time goes, the others’ accounts are extended by 
our own interventions and additions. Brackets that mark quotations emerge on 
the margin of the text; code names are attached to some of the quotations; and, 
above all, we add our comments here and there. After some time, we are study-
ing not exactly the same original data, but a much richer mixture of voices, our 
own voice being increasingly pervasive among them. This is how sociological 
text is produced out of the text of data. No sudden switch from the empirical to 
the sociological is possible, only slow growing of the latter into the former. 
Comments should therefore not be seen only as tools for preservation of 
ideas, but also (and perhaps rather more importantly, since the aim of analysis 
is not to just preserve ideas!) as a space in which sociological text is gradually 
born. As such they should be made whenever possible.  
Our ability to add a comment to a possible new free quotation or a link 
could even be well taken as a test of whether the creation of certain new objects 
is legitimate. It is typical that beginners produce new analytical objects of 
Atlas.ti in a rather free-and-easy way. Seduced by the effortlessness and speed 
with which new quotations or links can be made, they soon have thousands of 
coded quotations and hardly any item unlinked to anything else, without having 
an idea what to do with these huge quantities of connected objects. Careful 
consideration is in place, especially when non-trivial, “strong links” are at 
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stake.21 But what could be a feasible criterion for decisions about whether to 
link two quotations or codes or not? Some would suggest various kinds of 
rational criteria, but I recommend a pragmatic (and almost mechanical) one: is 
there anything worth of putting down about this particular text passage or con-
nection? If yes, then let us create the link with confidence and make the respec-
tive comment. But if we are unable to write a comment on the considered link 
at the time, and only have an uncertain “feeling” or “sensation”, then we should 
hesitate. If theory is to be grounded in empirical data then practical details, 
such as links grounded in arguments (not mentally, but virtually, in the form of 
written link comments), are observable procedural elements of it. 
Creation of quotations is somewhat different in this. The most common pur-
pose for creation of a new quotation is the need to code a piece of data. Often 
creation of a new quotation and coding can be considered a single operation.22 
Nonetheless, free quotations (unlinked – at the moment of creation – to a code) 
can be a very useful tool. We can imagine a procedure technically analogous to 
creation of free codes, which would consist of marking out only free quotations 
during an initial reading of data, without thinking of any codes (for the time 
being). Strategically, the procedure might be understood as an alterna-
tive/complement to what STRAUSS and CORBIN (1990, p.62) call “open 
coding”. And precisely for the production of free quotations we might use a 
similar rule as for links: commented free quotations are fully legitimate, un-
commented only as exceptions. 
4.2.2 How to see relevance? 
Let us assume that our data are segmented and coded carefully and with cir-
cumspection. Segments and codes are linked to each other by various kinds of 
relations where appropriate. Comments are attached to created objects and 
links (that are, in fact, analytical objects too), which – as I have just argued – 
enhances the quality and argumentative groundedness of our work. In short, a 
large number of partial and limited analytic considerations have been material-
ised (or rather virtualised) in the form of observable and manipulable objects – 
codes, quotations, comments and links … So far so good. But this surely can-
not be the end of analysis, but rather the beginning.  
What next then? What to start with? There are so many potential points of 
interest, so many possible questions. We now need to become focused. And we 
also need to reduce our empirical material and work further only with some 
parts of it, the most relevant ones. 
                                                             
21  Atlas.ti allows creation of qualifiable links (links of different kinds of relation) either 
between individual quotations or between codes – these are called “strong links” (MUHR & 
FRIESE 2004, p.212). 
22  Some software packages, such as Ethnograph (<http://www.qualisresearch.com>), origi-
nally even did not allow creation of free quotations. 
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But how can we recognize a relevant piece of text? How to identify the most 
relevant codes or memos? Some would suggest a really, really deep think. It’s 
time to step out from the somewhat mechanistic world of computer processing 
and finally start doing true intellectual work … but I don’t think so. On the 
contrary, this is the moment when we should stick to the computer and ask for 
an answer from Atlas.ti. No, I do not believe in magic (as might be implied by 
the quirk mentioned in the introduction). I only believe in relevance as an 
emergent and recognizable property of my entire work up to now. 
Indeed, a glance at the monitor and few clicks of mouse are enough in At-
las.ti to see which quotations are most relevant and thus most promising for 
further analytical scrutiny. Provided we have proceeded as described above, we 
can easily have a look at everything we have thought of our data. What exactly 
is worthy of notice? Simply put, an especially important piece of our data is a 
quotation for which we have a comment; and/or which is connected to several 
codes; and/or which has been linked to (an)other quotation(s), preferably with 
commented (argued) links; and/or which has appeared in noteworthy network 
views … But wait, which network views – among all the saved ones – are 
noteworthy? Again, it is the same principle: those with comments, those con-
taining relevant quotations and important codes. Important codes? Yes, those 
codes that are associated with higher numbers of quotations; that keep a spe-
cific position in the scheme of codes; that are used for classification of quota-
tions in key PDs (such as a project proposal); and/or that are linked to relevant 
memos. Relevant memos? Yes, again, those memos that are linked to interest-
ing quotations and codes (and therefore are conceptually and empirically satu-
rated); and those that are also linked to other memos so that they participate in 
the structure of an overall argument.23 
All these qualities are well and easily visible in Atlas.ti. Density and nature 
of links especially can be seen almost immediately. When you look at respec-
tive lists of objects, you become oriented in a few seconds. Recent versions of 
the programme even offer nice summarizing previews of co-ocurrences of 
codes in the data set. Possibilities of various synoptic views are overwhelming. 
Of course, you cannot start your analytic work with Atlas.ti by pressing the 
magic button marked “Relevant text search”; but after you have fruitfully spent 
some time on your data, many Atlas.ti buttons become truly magical: just click 
on the button that opens a small quotation manager window and then make one 
more click to sort your quotations by the number of links to other objects – and 
voila, here on the top we have candidates for the position of most relevant 
pieces of the data. In the same manager we immediately see which quotations 
are commented and we can even filter out uncommented ones. The list of can-
                                                             
23  The criteria should be applied sensitively. A quotation may be considered as relevant and 
suitable for further attention even if it is coded by a single code or no comment is attached – 
provided, for instance, it is coded by an especially important code. Simply put, the criteria 
are not strict, but they still provide good orientation. 
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didates gets more narrow and solid. There are several ways to find out how 
many codes (and which codes) are associated with the candidate quotations. 
Are these important codes? If yes, the respective quotation should be elevated 
in the ranking of candidates. And so on.24 
You can see all this quickly and easily, without serious or deep considera-
tions involved. Well, not really. But the important acts of thinking have already 
happened, in countless moments of our coding, segmenting, commenting, 
linking …; and now it is sufficient to only take a brief look and make use of 
these numerous small acts materialized and visualized in a powerful sum. If 
you trust your judgement, as it has been applied during the longterm and de-
tailed work with individual PDs, quotations and other objects, you can com-
fortably rely upon the criteria outlined above. They help to crown your entire 
effort.  
4.2.3 Reading data in a new way 
From the suggested point of view, the quality and relevance of concepts and 
their empirical content are the results of the ongoing analytical work, not its 
precondition. Relevance is made. And it is made not exactly by our thinking 
alone. Rather, as something that can easily be seen, it is produced by material 
practices, in which the virtual environment of the computer plays a crucial role 
of mediator. Atlas.ti provides an interface in which and through which we do 
thinking. 
We could similarly describe practical counterparts of some other mental op-
erations. Let us take, for instance, the situation when we need to temporarily 
look away from theoretical concepts used up to the moment and look at our 
data “with new eyes”. This is a difficult task for one’s mind, requiring a lot of 
self-discipline and renunciation. But it has a very practical dimension. We can 
arrange our working environment, our virtual scene, so that the software takes 
on (at least partly) the burden of the above-mentioned intellectual challenge. It 
is possible, with a few clicks of mouse, to simply filter out all the respective 
codes – i.e., the codes that embody the above-mentioned theoretical concepts. 
As a result, they completely disappear from the virtual desk. They can be found 
neither in the code manager nor in the object explorer. These codes are re-
moved even from the margin area. Simply put, they temporarily cease to exist. 
And this is how it is practically done that the studied documents are read (as 
much as possible) “anew”, without the conceptual burden of previous analysis. 
Out of sight, out of mind.  
                                                             
24  It should be noted for those who are not familiar with programmes such as Atlas.ti that one 
can easily skip from lists and overviews to quotations themselves and their original loca-
tions. In other words, we not only see whether a quotation is commented or not or how 
many links it has to other objects, we can immediately read it in full length. 
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Making things temporarily invisible, or rather something we could call se-
lective visualisation, is an important aspect of the visualisation principle. It 
occurs, in fact, all the time. Imagine the most ordinary situation when we 
browse quotations ascribed to a code or several codes. Such a procedure sub-
stantially transforms our reading of the data. We do not read individual docu-
ments as usual anymore, i.e., one after another. Instead of studying the inter-
view with Mr. Miller, then the legal document, then a sociological article, then 
another interview, and so on, we proceed transversely. By listing and viewing 
all the quotations coded, e.g., by the code “money”, we construct – out of the 
original data and in addition to them – a new composite and multi-vocal text on 
financial matters. This composite text is another embodiment of our progres-
sive moving from original contexts and meanings to a sociological argument. 
As a new element, a newly created object, it belongs a little less to our respon-
dents and a little more to us, analysts. 
When I speak of the construction of a new text I do not mean it as a meta-
phor. What we have here is a quite real sequence of sentences and paragraphs, 
which can be read on the monitor from the beginning to end and which can be 
saved as a new document or even printed on paper. We can even assign such a 
newly created document as another PD to our project (hermeneutical unit) and 
treat it as material to be further analysed.25 … Why should we? Because once 
the pieces of data are cut off from original contexts and put to other (themati-
cally defined) relationships, they tell a story unheard so far. What seemed to be 
important at first may suddenly appear as a minor issue; conversely, what we 
originally considered as marginal may gain importance, since, for instance, it 
becomes clear how often different people mention it. A space for new insights 
and ideas opens up, which brings about new textual additions (comments, links, 
codings), and thus also new relevances … the serendipity principle in action. 
What then constitutes the new quality of sociological reading of data? How 
is a new understanding of reality born? Initially it seems that interpretation of 
qualitative data involves a range of manipulations with textual units – manipu-
lations that stem from repeated reading of one and the same set of collected 
data. A closer look, however, reveals something else. The researcher in fact 
manipulates the texts of data so that new texts are progressively created (writ-
ten) out of the old ones and alongside them. It is not a linear process, but a 
tangled and intermittent procedure. As its result, a number of new accounts 
emerge, in which the voices of studied actors are still present, but more and 
more so is the voice of the researcher. These new accounts offer and provoke 
new perspectives and insights. Such a textual practice, based as much on writ-
ing as on reading, is the primary vehicle of the production of a new understand-
ing. 
                                                             
25  This might be considered as a “system closure” (RICHARDS & RICHARDS 1994). 
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Once we start considering “natural” activities of consciousness such as 
thinking or seeing26 as embodied material practices, we better realize on what 
grounds sociological interpretation truly separates from ordinary social inter-
pretations. Sociologists score primarily not by bright and refined minds or 
sharp eyes, but rather by everything they practically perform with their data. 
What appears as reading one and the same data in a new way, which can be 
taken as a desireable outcome of analysis, is in fact an effect of the procedure 
in which we artfully produce new and new (versions of) texts and read them 
with basically one and the same set of eyes and mind. 
5. Conclusions 
It can be said that CAQDAS has brought about extraordinary easiness, speed, 
and reliability with which we can move through and through extensive data sets 
and with which we are able to remember, recollect and think. But programmes 
such as Atlas.ti offer much more than that. They enable us to see from various 
perspectives what (we believe) happens in our minds. The sophisticated inter-
face of these software tools is important not only to allow intuitive and com-
fortable operation, but also because it brings a range of mutually related de-
vices of visualisation. 
Atlas.ti therefore enables researchers to think in a visible way. Visualised 
thoughts or mental operations can easily be stored, recollected, classified, 
linked, filtered out in great numbers … and made meaningful in sum. Visuali-
sation implies, for instance, that codes are not only mental entities or concepts, 
but also named elements of various size and colour that can be manipulated by 
hands and controlled by vision. Thus, thinking made visible is by the same 
token thinking made more accountable and instructable.27 
Thinking is inseparable from doing. This is an important, but neglected les-
son for qualitative analysis. It is paradoxical that so many texts on qualitative 
methodology ignore the lesson, given the fact that it was introduced and elabo-
rated within several related intellectual traditions that constitute the theoretical 
background of key qualitative approaches.28 The advent of CAQDAS even 
deepened the paradox. Software packages for qualitative analysis are often 
                                                             
26  Seeing as instructed and material practice has been nicely demonstrated, from an eth-
nomethodological perspective, in a recent conference paper by LAURIER and BROWN 
(2005). 
27  Instructability was recently highlighted by GARFINKEL (2002) as a key concept for 
ethnomethodological understanding of practical action which can never be fully dependent 
on rule-following, but which is still understandable and accountable. 
28  I refer here, above all, to phenomenology (MERLEAU-PONTY 2002 [1945]), 
ethnomethodology (GARFINKEL 1967; HOLSTEIN & GUBRIUM 1994), post-
structuralism (DERRIDA 1976; DENZIN 1994, 1995), and constructivism (BERGER & 
LUCKMANN 1967; SCHWANDT 1994). 
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presented as tools that can extend and support capabilities of researcher’s mind, 
but that cannot “really think”. As such, they reaffirm the mentalistic, essentially 
methodological conception of knowledge.  
Inspired by contemporary science and technology studies, I have attempted 
to show CAQDAS and qualitative analysis in a different light. Instead of de-
scribing ordinary moments of qualitative analysis and interpretation in terms of 
specific mental operations (represented in the software’s interface), I have 
emphasised material practices and manipulations. The analytic work with At-
las.ti is especially suitable for such reframing. Indeed, it might be argued that 
qualitative computing is misunderstood insofar as software packages are not 
seen as virtual environments or media for embodied and practice-based knowl-
edge making. Inseparablity of thinking and doing in qualitative analysis is 
hardly observable better elsewhere. 
Grounded theory methodology (broadly defined), this more or less explicit 
alter ego of CAQDAS, has been reframed too. When described not in terms of 
methodological or theoretical concepts but rather in terms of what we practi-
cally do with the analysed data, grounded theory becomes perfectly compatible 
with the textualist, post-structuralist paradigm (from which it has allegedly 
departed considerably). As Zygmunt BAUMAN summarises (1992, pp.130f.): 
One of the most important boundaries that cannot be drawn clearly and that 
generate ambiguity in the very process of being compulsively drawn is that 
between the text and its interpretation. The central message of Derrida is that 
interpretation is but an extension of the text, that it “grows into” the text from 
which it wants to set itself apart, and thus the text expands while being inter-
preted which precludes the possibility of the text ever being exhausted in in-
terpretation. 
And this is precisely what we have seen. The way analysts manipulate, 
transform and extend PDs in Atlas.ti (or with scissors, glue, and colour pencils) 
might be taken as an empirical demonstration of this post-structuralist argu-
ment. To put it differently, GTM looks desparately “modern”, scientistic, and 
far away from what was brought about by the textual turn in the social science 
only insofar as its procedures are interpreted “immaterially”, i.e., as basically 
conceptual work on data. Once we take seriously STRAUSS’s statement, 
quoted at the beginning, that qualitative analysis should be understood as both 
physical and conceptual sets of tasks, GTM becomes open to all post-structural 
and radical constructivist sensitivity. 
Such understanding of GTM, however, does not imply a loss of normativity 
and instructability. The contrary is true. While GTM has always been popular 
among teachers and students for its relative ability to be formulated as practical 
and understandable guidelines for action, the proposed reframing would only 
enhance this virtue. 
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